

DATE 31 OCT 1986

SOVA ROUTING SLIP

	Action	Info	Initial
D/SOVA		✓	
DD/SOVA		✓	<i>[Signature]</i>
EO			<i>[Signature]</i>
ES/AB			
ES/PBB			
SIG		✓	
SIG/SED		✓	
SIG/SPD		✓	
NIG			
NIG/EPD			
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SUSPENSE DATE			

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT **ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	C/ACIS		X		
18	D/SOVA		X		
19	D/OSWR		X		
20	NIO/USSR		X		
21	NIO/SP		X		
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

H Executive Secretary
30 Oct 86

Date

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90744

Executive Registry

86- 5103

October 29, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: NSDD-249 on Supplemental Guidance for the Current
NST Negotiating Round (S)

The President has approved the attached National Security
Decision Directive providing supplemental guidance for the
current round of negotiations in the Nuclear and Space Talks.
(S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

John M. Poindexter
John M. Poindexter

Attachment:
NSDD-249 (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 249

October 29, 1986

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CURRENT NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (S)

The attached instructions supplement existing guidance for the current round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which began on September 18, 1986, in Geneva. They set forth in detail the proposals made to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meeting with him in Reykjavik, Iceland, and provide guidance for building on the agreements we reached there. (S)

Ronald Reagan

Attachments

1. Overall Instructions of October 21, 1986 (S)
2. START Instructions of October 21, 1986 (S)
3. Defense and Space Instructions of October 21, 1986 (S)
4. INF Instructions of October 22, 1986 (S)
5. Overall Instructions of October 27, 1986 (S)
6. Defense and Space Instructions of October 27, 1986 (S)

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SYSTEM II
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ATTACHMENT 1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #0271 2950316
O 220311Z OCT 86
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL NST GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1743
SECRET STATE 330271

EXDIS, USNST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, INF, START, MCAP, SPA, NST DST
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR US SOVIET NUCLEAR
AND SPACE TALKS

REF: STATE 291634

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE NST
DELEGATION FOR ROUND VI, REFLECTING DISCUSSIONS IN
OCTOBER 11-12 REYKJAVIK MEETING. WASHINGTON CONTINUES
TO EVALUATE HOW BEST TO BUILD UPON POSITIVE

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THAT MEETING AND WILL PROVIDE
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE SHORTLY, INCLUDING GUIDANCE ON THE
CONCEPT OF ELIMINATING ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES
AND ITS LINK TO OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE ABM
TREATY. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE (REFTEL) REMAINS VALID EXCEPT
AS MODIFIED BELOW. GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF THE THREE
NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPTEL.

3. U.S OBJECTIVES FOR THE REMAINDER OF ROUND VI
INCLUDE:

-- TO BUILD UPON THE POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF
REYKJAVIK BY INDUCING THE SOVIETS TO CONTINUE THE
SERIOUSNESS AND FLEXIBILITY THAT THEY HAVE SHOWN THERE.

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-- TO PRESENT U.S. PROPOSALS FOR ELIMINATING THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED IN REYKJAVIK, AS SET FORTH IN THE INSTRUCTIONS TO EACH NEGOTIATING GROUP.

-- TO REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO MISCHARACTERIZE THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED IN ICELAND.

-- TO REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO HOLD PROGRESS IN ONE NEGOTIATING FORUM HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN ANOTHER. DELEGATION SHOULD VIGOROUSLY RESIST TO ANY SOVIET CHARACTERIZATION THAT PROGRESS IN INF IS ONCE AGAIN LINKED TO PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS, NOTING THAT THIS CONTRADICTS SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDING REACHED DURING GENEVA SUMMIT TO SEEK A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT AND TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS IN AREAS OF COMMON GROUND.

4. SHOULD SOVIETS RAISE ISSUE OF ELIMINATION OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES BY 1996, AS PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT IN REYKJAVIK, DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE THAT THE FIRST STEP IN THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES MUST BE THE 50-PERCENT START REDUCTIONS AND SIGNIFICANT INF REDUCTIONS DISCUSSED IN REYKJAVIK AND THAT IT IS MORE EFFICIENT TO DISCUSS THESE STEPS FIRST. (FYI: WASHINGTON ANTICIPATES REPLACING THIS GUIDANCE WITH DETAILED GUIDANCE ON BALLISTIC MISSILE ELIMINATION BY 27 OCTOBER.)

5. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE OTHER NON-NST ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, THE DELEGATION SHOULD RESIST THAT THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA, NOT NST. SHOULD THE SOVIETS SPECIFICALLY LINK NUCLEAR TESTING AND PROGRESS IN NST, AS SUGGESTED BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK, DELEGATION SHOULD REPLY THAT THE

UNITED STATES EXPRESSED ITS READINESS IN REYKJAVIK TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUES AND THAT SPECIFIC SOVIET RECOMMENDATIONS SHOULD BE RAISED IN THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD RESIST ANY FURTHER SOVIET EFFORTS TO DISCUSS LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE NST FORUM. ~~SECRET~~

** END OF CABLE **

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ATTACHMENT 2

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APPROVED START INSTRUCTIONS

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #0273 2950318
O 220312Z OCT 86
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL NST GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
S E C R E T STATE 330273

EXDIS, USSTART

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, START, MCAP, NE
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR START NEGOTIATING
GROUP

REF: (A) STATE 291634 (B) STATE 290210

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE START

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NEGOTIATING GROUP IN ROUND VI, REFLECTING DISCUSSIONS IN OCTOBER 11-12 REYKJAVIK MEETING. WASHINGTON CONTINUES TO EVALUATE HOW BEST TO BUILD UPON POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THAT MEETING AND WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE SHORTLY, INCLUDING GUIDANCE ON

TIMEFRAME FOR 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS AND ON THE CONCEPT OF ELIMINATING ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES.

3. IT IS THE U.S. UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FOLLOWING WAS AGREED AND, THEREFORE, THE U.S. START NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE BY THE SOVIETS:

-- A 1600 CEILING ON ICBMS, SLBMS, HEAVY BOMBERS;

-- A 6000 CEILING ON WARHEADS, TO INCLUDE ICBM WARHEADS, SLBM WARHEADS, AND LONG-RANGE ALCMS.

-- ALL HEAVY BOMBERS COUNT AGAINST THE SNDV LIMIT. EACH HEAVY BOMBER CARRYING GRAVITY BOMBS OR SRAMS WOULD COUNT AS ONE WARHEAD TOWARD THE LIMIT OF 6000. EACH ALCM CARRIED BY HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD COUNT AS ONE WARHEAD. (FYI: AS PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE PROVISIONS, ACCOUNTING RULES FOR IMPLEMENTING THEM WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT, AND WASHINGTON INVITES DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON SUCH RULES.)

-- CONSIDERATION OF APPROPRIATE SUBLIMITS WOULD CONTINUE.

-- HEAVY ICBMS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED.

-- THE SIDES SHALL FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO LIMITING DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS. WHEN SUCH A SOLUTION IS FOUND, IT WILL NOT INVOLVE COUNTING LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS WITHIN THE 6000/1600 LIMITS. IN THIS REGARD, THE DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK OUT DETAILS, ESPECIALLY DETAILS RELATING TO VERIFICATION, OF THE SOVIET POSITION THAT WOULD ATTEMPT TO MEET U.S. CONCERNS.

4. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ABOVE AGREEMENT ON COUNTING GRAVITY BOMBS AND SRAMS, THE PREVIOUS U.S. PROPOSAL TO LIMIT HEAVY BOMBERS TO 350 IS REDUNDANT AND IS NO LONGER A PART OF OUR POSITION.

5. AT REYKJAVIK, THE SIDES UNDERSTOOD THAT OTHER PROVISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDED TO WHAT WAS AGREED IN ORDER TO MAKE A COMPLETE AGREEMENT. A NUMBER OF SUBLIMITS WERE DISCUSSED BUT NOT AGREED; IT WAS AGREED THE CONSIDERATION OF SUBLIMITS WOULD CONTINUE. THE U.S. START NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD PROPOSE THAT THERE BE SUBLIMITS ON:

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-- BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS;

-- ICBM WARHEADS;

-- WARHEADS ON ALL PERMITTED ICBMS EXCEPT THOSE ON SILO-BASED LIGHT AND MEDIUM ICBMS WITH SIX OR FEWER WARHEADS;

-- WHILE THE PREFERRED NUMBERS FOR THESE SUBLIMITS REMAIN 4500, 3000, AND 1500 RESPECTIVELY, THE US START NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO PROPOSE SUBLIMITS OF

4800 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, 1500 ICBM WARHEADS, AND 1650 WARHEADS ON ICBMS EXCEPT SILO-BASED LIGHT OR MEDIUM ICBMS WITH SIX OR FEWER WARHEADS. (NOTE: THIS PROPOSAL

RESULTS IN NO RPT NO SUBLIMIT ON ALCMS.)

-- THE AFOREMENTIONED SUBLIMITS ARE THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SOVIET OFFER IN REYKJAVIK THAT HEAVY ICBMS BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. THE U.S. SIDE ANTICIPATES THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WILL REDUCE HEAVY ICBMS SIGNIFICANTLY (E.G., BY ROUGHLY HALF) IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER.

-- ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE 50-PERCENT U.S. START PROPOSAL REMAIN THE SAME (E.G., THE BAN ON MOBILE ICBMS AND THE 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT).

6. THE OCTOBER 15 SOVIET PRIMARY STATEMENT CITED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN TOTAL SNDVS AND WEAPONS AS WELL AS IN EACH CATEGORY OF STRATEGIC SYSTEM (I.E., ICBMS, SLBMS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS) WHICH WAS PRESENTED IN REYKJAVIK AND REJECTED BY THE U.S.. SHOULD THIS FORMULATION BE TABLED IN GENEVA, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD REJECT THE PROPOSAL AS FOLLOWS:

-- IN REYKJAVIK THE SIDES AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, SPECIFICALLY TO 1600 SNDVS AND 6000 WARHEADS APPROPRIATELY APPLIED. CERTAIN OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INITIAL SOVIET FORMULATION PRESENTED IN REYKJAVIK WERE DETERMINED BY THE U.S. AT THE TIME TO RESULT IN AN INEQUITABLE OUTCOME AND THEREFORE REJECTED. THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS BUILDS ON THOSE ELEMENTS MUTUALLY AGREED AT REYKJAVIK AND PROVIDES FOR AN AGREED EQUITABLE OUTCOME.

7. EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION IS ESSENTIAL TO BOTH SIDES. AS AGREED AT GENEVA LAST YEAR, VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED CONCURRENTLY WITH REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. THE TWO SIDES SHOULD SEEK TO APPLY PROGRESS MADE IN INF WITH RESPECT TO VERIFICATION PRINCIPLES (SEE INF INSTRUCTIONS, PARA 4) TO THE

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NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

8. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED ABOVE, PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.

9. PARAGRAPH 9A CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE INITIAL SOVIET PROPOSAL MADE IN REYKJAVIK THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 11. PARAGRAPH 9B CONTAINS THE LANGUAGE AGREED TO BY THE U.S.-SOVIET EXPERTS GROUP DURING THE EARLY MORNING OF 12 OCTOBER. BOTH ARE PROVIDED FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP.

-- A. INITIAL SOVIET PROPOSAL, AM OCTOBER 11. ON STRATEGIC ARMS. AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE BY FIFTY PERCENT

THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE USSR AND THE USA TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE HISTORICALLY FORMED DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE STRUCTURES OF THE PARTIES' STRATEGIC FORCES. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, REDUCTIONS SHALL APPLY TO ALL TYPES OF OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS, INCLUDING HEAVY MISSILES. A SOLUTION SHALL ALSO BE FOUND WITH REGARD TO LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES.

ON ALL MATTERS RELATING TO THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THE PARTIES WILL NEGOTIATE HAVING REGARD FOR THEIR MUTUAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS, AND DISPLAYING A POLITICAL WILL TO REACH AGREEMENT.

-- B. EXPERTS GROUP AGREED LANGUAGE EARLY AM OCTOBER

12. ON STRATEGIC ARMS. AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE PREPARED TO REDUCE BY FIFTY PERCENT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO AN EQUAL NUMBER OF ICBMS, SLBMS AND HEAVY BOMBERS (APPROXIMATELY 1600) AND WARHEADS (NOT MORE THAN 6000), TAKING INTO ACCOUNT HISTORICALLY FORMED DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE STRUCTURES OF THE PARTIES' STRATEGIC FORCES. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, REDUCTIONS SHALL APPLY TO ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF HEAVY MISSILES. A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION SHALL ALSO BE FOUND TO LIMITING DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMED SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES.

ON ALL MATTERS RELATING TO THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THE PARTIES WILL NEGOTIATE HAVING REGARD FOR THEIR MUTUAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS, AND DISPLAYING A POLITICAL WILL TO REACH AGREEMENT. SHLTZ

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ATTACHMENT 3

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APPROVED DEFENSE SPACE INSTRUCTIONS

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #0272 2950317
O 220311Z OCT 86
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL NST GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
S E C R E T STATE 330272

EXDIS, USDST

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, MCAP, TSPA, NST, DST
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR DEFENSE AND SPACE
NEGOTIATING GROUP

REF: (A) STATE 291909; (B) STATE 29566

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE TO THE DEFENSE AND
SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR ROUND VI, BASED ON US
PROPOSALS MADE TO THE SOVIET UNION IN IRELAND MEETING

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BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ON OCTOBER 11-12. THIS GUIDANCE IS IN ADDITION TO, AND DOES NOT REPLACE GUIDANCE FOR D&S NEGOTIATING GROUP OF REFTELS (A) AND (B) AND PREVIOUS ROUNDS, EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY NOTED BELOW.

3. THE EXISTING US PROPOSAL AS CONTAINED IN PREVIOUS GUIDANCE AND IN THE PRESIDENT'S JULY 25 LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV REMAINS ON THE TABLE.

4. PARAGRAPH (4A) CONTAINS THE INITIAL SOVIET PROPOSAL MADE IN REYKJAVIK ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE DISCUSSIONS. PARAGRAPH (4B) PROVIDES THE TEXT OF THE FIRST US ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE SECOND DAY OF DISCUSSIONS. PARAGRAPH (4C) PROVIDES THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL MADE THAT SAME AFTERNOON. PARAGRAPH (4D) PROVIDES THE TEXT OF THE SECOND AND LAST US ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL MADE IN WRITING BY THE PRESIDENT. THESE ARE FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP.

A. SOVIET PROPOSAL, AM OCTOBER 11. FOR THE PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING THE REGIME OF THE 1972 TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, AN UNDERSTANDING SHALL BE REACHED THAT THE USSR AND THE USA UNDERTAKE NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THAT TREATY FOR A PERIOD OF TEN YEARS, AND TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH ALL ITS PROVISIONS THROUGHOUT THAT PERIOD. TESTING IN SPACE OF ALL MISSILE-DEFENSE SPACE SYSTEMS SHALL BE PROHIBITED EXCEPT FOR RESEARCH AND TESTING CARRIED OUT IN LABORATORIES. THIS WOULD NOT ENTAIL A BAN ON THE TESTING OF SUCH FIXED LAND-BASED SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS AS ARE ALLOWED UNDER THE ABM TREATY. SUBSEQUENTLY, WITHIN SEVERAL YEARS, THE PARTIES SHALL NEGOTIATE FURTHER MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IN THIS AREA. THE PARTIES DEEM IT APPROPRIATE TO UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL EFFORTS WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS BANNING ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS.

B. FIRST US PROPOSAL, PM OCTOBER 12. BOTH SIDES WOULD AGREE TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH IS PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY, FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS, THROUGH 1991, DURING WHICH TIME A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS WOULD BE ACHIEVED. THIS BEING DONE, BOTH SIDES WOULD CONTINUE THE PACE OF REDUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ALL REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH THE GOAL OF THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES BY THE END OF THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PERIOD. AS LONG AS THESE REDUCTIONS CONTINUE AT THE APPROPRIATE PACE, THE SAME RESTRICTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO APPLY AT THE END OF TEN

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YEAR PERIOD, WITH ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES ELIMINATED, EITHER SIDE WOULD BE FREE TO DEPLOY DEFENSES.

C. SOVIET PROPOSAL, PM OCTOBER 12. THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD UNDERTAKE FOR TEN YEARS NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, AND DURING THAT PERIOD STRICTLY TO OBSERVE ALL ITS PROVISIONS. THE TESTING IN SPACE OF ALL SPACE COMPONENTS OF MISSILE

DEFENSE IS PROHIBITED, EXCEPT RESEARCH AND TESTING CONDUCTED IN LABORATORIES. WITHIN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS

OF THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD (AND THUS THROUGH 1991), THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT. DURING THE FOLLOWING FIVE YEARS OF THAT PERIOD, THE REMAINING 50 PERCENT OF THE TWO SIDES' STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SHALL BE REDUCED. THUS BY THE END OF 1996, THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE BEEN TOTALLY ELIMINATED.

D. SECOND US PROPOSAL, PM OCTOBER 12. THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES UNDERTAKE FOR TEN YEARS NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, DURING THAT PERIOD STRICTLY TO OBSERVE ALL ITS PROVISIONS WHILE CONTINUING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY. WITHIN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD (AND THUS THROUGH 1991) THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT. DURING THE FOLLOWING FIVE YEARS OF THAT PERIOD, ALL REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE REDUCED. THUS BY THE END OF 1996, ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE BEEN TOTALLY ELIMINATED. AT THE END OF THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD, EITHER SIDE COULD DEPLOY DEFENSES IF IT SO CHOSE UNLESS THE PARTIES AGREE OTHERWISE.

5. GUIDANCE ON THE US PROPOSALS MADE AT REYKJAVIK IS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON, INCLUDING ADDITIONAL ANALYTICAL WORK. IN THE INTERIM, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD AVOID DISCUSSION OF THE SPECIFICS OF EITHER OF THE US PROPOSALS.

6. IF QUESTIONED ABOUT THE PROPOSALS MADE IN REYKJAVIK, THE US NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD RESPOND THAT THE US INTENDS TO BUILD UPON THE POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING AND THAT THE US WILL BE MAKING A PROPOSAL IN GENEVA BASED ON THESE ACCOMPLISHMENTS SHORTLY. ASKED WHETHER THE

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ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS SUGGESTED IN THE US PROPOSALS
DISCUSSED IN REYKJAVIK DEPEND UPON OTHER CONDITIONS, THE
NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD NOTE THAT IN REYKJAVIK IT WAS
CLEAR BY THE TERMS OF THE PROPOSAL MADE THAT THE
ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS INCLUDED IN THE PROPOSALS TABLED
BY THE US WERE STRICTLY CONDITIONED ON THE TWO SIDES'
REACHING A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT NOW ON A

SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS RESULTING IN 50 PERCENT
REDUCTIONS IN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES OF BOTH
SIDES TO EQUAL LEVELS BY 1991 AND TOTAL ELIMINATION OF
THE OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF BOTH SIDES BY 1996. SHULTZ
** END OF CABLE **

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ATTACHMENT 4

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APPROVED INF INSTRUCTIONS

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #1883 2961347
O 231335Z OCT 86 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL NST GENEVA NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000 NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECRET STATE 331883

EXDIS US INFEL GENEVA

CORRECTED COPY (PARA 5 SUB PARA 5 LINE 1 MISSING)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, NST, INF

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP

A) STATE 290224 (B) STATE 12553

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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP IN ROUND VI, REQUESTING DISCUSSIONS IN OCTOBER 11-12 REYKJAVIK MEETING. WASHINGTON CONTINUES TO

EVALUATE HOW BEST TO BUILD UPON POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THAT MEETING AND WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE SHORTLY, INCLUDING GUIDANCE ON THE CONCEPT OF ELIMINATING ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE (REF A) REMAINS VALID EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW.

3. AGREED APPROACH. BASED ON REYKJAVIK DISCUSSION, THE U.S. IS READY TO ACCEPT--AND WE UNDERSTAND THE SOVIETS CAN ACCEPT--AN LRINF CEILING OF 100 WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE, MADE UP OF ZERO WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE IN EUROPE AND 100 WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE OUTSIDE OF EUROPE IN SOVIET ASIA ON THE SOVIET SIDE, AND IN THE U.S. ON THE U.S. SIDE. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONFIRM SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THIS APPROACH.

4. THE U.S. BELIEVES--AND UNDERSTANDS THAT THE SOVIETS ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE--THAT IN ANY AGREEMENT THERE SHOULD BE SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH INCLUDE: (1) A COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE EXCHANGE OF DATA, BOTH PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER; (2) ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION TO AGREED LEVELS; AND (3) EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE REMAINING IN INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ON THE SPECIFICS OF VERIFICATION CONTINUES TO APPLY.

5. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS. AT REYKJAVIK, THE SIDES UNDERSTOOD THAT OTHER PROVISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDED TO WHAT WAS AGREED IN ORDER TO MAKE A COMPLETE AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE U.S. PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING:

- -- REDUCTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE APPROACH IN PARA 3 WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A PHASED MANNER TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO THE END OF 1991.

- -- PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ON THE BOUNDARIES OF SOVIET ASIA (REF B) CONTINUES TO APPLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE APPROACH IN PARA 3.

- -- THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT TO RESTRICT THE 100 RESIDUAL SOVIET WARHEADS ON 33 SS-20 MISSILES ALLOWED UNDER PARA 3 TO KANSK OR BARNAUL, PREFERABLY KANSK. IN PURSUING THIS EFFORT, HOWEVER, GROUP MAY NOT OFFER RECIPROCAL U.S. LIMITATIONS INVOLVING NON-DEPLOYMENT IN ALASKA. PREVIOUS CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION TO USE ALASKAN-NON-DEPLOYMENT (REF 10, REF A) IS WITHDRAWN.

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-- AN INF AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE AS WELL GLOBAL CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF MISSILES AS PREVIOUSLY TABLED (REF. B) NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IN SRINF MISSILES WILL BEGIN WITHIN SIX MONTHS AFTER AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT IS REACHED.

-- THE U.S. CONTINUES TO REQUIRE THAT ANY INTERIM INF AGREEMENT BE OF INDEFINITE DURATION, UNTIL REPLACED BY AN AGREEMENT ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS; NEGOTIATIONS ON

SUCH A FURTHER AGREEMENT WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR AS PART OF ANY INTERIM AGREEMENT.

6. THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STRESS THAT THE U.S. PROCEEDS ON THE PREMISE THAT AN INF AGREEMENT CAN BE

NEGOTIATED, CONCLUDED AND IMPLEMENTED SEPARATELY FROM DEFENSE AND SPACE AND START ISSUES AND THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT ACCEPT ANY CONTRARY PREMISE FOR PROCEEDING TOWARD AN INF AGREEMENT.

7. PARAGRAPH 7A CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE INITIAL SOVIET INF PROPOSAL MADE IN REYKJAVIK THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 11. PARAGRAPH 7B CONTAINS THE U.S. COUNTERPROPOSAL TABLED AT THE U.S.-SOVIET EXPERTS GROUP MEETING DURING THE EARLY MORNING OF 12 OCTOBER. THERE IS NO FINAL AGREEMENT TO THIS LANGUAGE. BOTH SETS OF LANGUAGE ARE PROVIDED FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP ONLY.

A. SOVIET PROPOSAL, AM OCTOBER 11, ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. AN AGREEMENT ON THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF SOVIET AND U.S. MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE THE NUCLEAR POTENTIALS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE NOT TO BE AFFECTED OR TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE INITIATED ON THE PARTIES' MISSILES WITH RANGES BELOW 1,000 KILOMETERS. SEPARATELY, AND AS EARLY AS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE, NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE INITIATED ON SOVIET AND U.S. MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS IN ASIA.

B. U.S. LANGUAGE TABLED AT EXPERTS GROUP, PM OCTOBER 11. THE SIDES AGREE:

-- THAT SINCE THERE DOES NOT YET EXIST AN AGREEMENT ON THE PROPER TREATMENT OF LRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS IN ASIA, THE RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE SHALL BE FOUND ON A PRIORITY BASIS.

THERE WILL BE LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF MISSILES TO THE CURRENT SOVIET LEVEL WHICH WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CAPABILITIES OF THESE SYSTEMS AND REFLECT EQUALITY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.

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-- THERE WILL BE SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH INCLUDE: (1) A COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE EXCHANGE OF DATA, BOTH PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER; (2) ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF DESTRUCTION DOWN TO AGREED LEVELS; AND (3) EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE REMAINING ICBM INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION.

-- U.S. AND SOVIET ICBM MISSILE SYSTEMS WILL REMAIN SUBJECT TO AND CONSTRAINED BY THIS AGREEMENT UNTIL THE SIDES NEGOTIATE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THESE

SYSTEMS. SHULTZ
** END OF CABLE **

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90744
ATTACHMENT 5

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR NST DELEGATION
TAGS: PARM, NST
REFS: (A) STATE 330271 (B) STATE 291634

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
2. REFTEL A PROVIDED INITIAL POST-REYKJAVIK GUIDANCE FOR THE NST DELEGATION FOR ROUND 11-12 REYKJAVIK MEETING. THIS CABLE PROVIDES ADDITIONAL CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE ON RELATIONS OF SNF TO THE CONCEPT OF ELIMINATING ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE (REFS A AND B) REMAINS VALID EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS BEING PROVIDED SEPTEL. THERE WILL BE NO ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR START AND INF NEGOTIATING GROUPS THIS ROUND.
3. THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES, OF WHATEVER RANGE, INVOLVES SNF SYSTEMS OF RANGES LESS THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS. DISCUSSION OF SUCH SYSTEMS MAY REQUIRE AN APPROPRIATE NEGOTIATING FORUM. ONLY THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF ELIMINATING ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED THIS ROUND. SHOULD THE SOVIETS RAISE QUESTIONS ON NEGOTIATING FORUM FOR SNF MISSILES IN THIS REGARD, DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE THAT AT THIS TIME IT IS THE U.S. OPINION THAT THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY PROVIDE THE MOST LOGICAL FORUM.
4. ONCE DELEGATION HAS REVIEWED THESE INSTRUCTIONS AND SUPPORTING INSTRUCTIONS TO INDIVIDUAL NEGOTIATING GROUPS, WASHINGTON WOULD WELCOME DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON APPROPRIATE ENDING DATE FOR CURRENT NEGOTIATING ROUND.

SECRET

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SECRET

SECRETSYSTEM II
90744
ATTACHMENT 6SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE
NEGOTIATING GROUP

TAGS: PARM, MCAP, TSPA, DST

REF: (A) STATE 291909; (B) STATE 293566; (C) STATE 330272

1. SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR ROUND VI. IT SUPPLEMENTS THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN REF C. THIS GUIDANCE IS IN ADDITION TO, AND DOES NOT REPLACE GUIDANCE FOR D&S NEGOTIATING GROUP OF REFTELS (A), (B) AND (C) EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. THERE WILL BE NO ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR START AND INF NEGOTIATING GROUPS THIS ROUND.
3. IN ADDITION TO THE EXISTING PROPOSAL IN THE PRESIDENT'S JULY 25 LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, WHICH REMAINS ON THE TABLE, THE US NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO PRESENT THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS FOR AN AGREEMENT WHICH WE PROPOSED IN REYKJAVIK AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT'S JULY PROPOSAL.
 - THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD UNDERTAKE FOR TEN YEARS NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, AND DURING THAT PERIOD STRICTLY TO OBSERVE ALL ITS PROVISIONS WHILE CONTINUING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY.
 - WITHIN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD (AND THUS THROUGH 1991), THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT.
 - DURING THE FOLLOWING FIVE YEARS OF THAT PERIOD, THE REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE ELIMINATED.
 - THUS, BY THE END OF 1996, ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE BEEN TOTALLY ELIMINATED, AND EITHER SIDE COULD DEPLOY ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES IF IT SO CHOSE, UNLESS THE PARTIES AGREE OTHERWISE.
4. THE ABOVE UNDERTAKINGS WOULD BE RECORDED IN A NEW TREATY.
5. IN PRESENTING THE ABOVE PROPOSAL, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE UNDERTAKING WOULD BE STRICTLY CONDITIONED ON THE TWO SIDES REACHING A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT NOW, AS PART OF A NEW AGREEMENT, ON A SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS RESULTING IN 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES TO EQUAL LEVELS BY 1991 AND TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF BOTH SIDES BY 1996.

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6. WHEN PRESENTING THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN PARA 3-5, THE US NEGOTIATOR SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IN NOT EXERCISING ITS RIGHTS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY, NEITHER SIDE WOULD BE FORFEITING ITS RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FOR REASONS OF ITS SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST, OR TO RESPOND TO A MATERIAL BREACH, OR OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES RECOGNIZED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. HE SHOULD INDICATE THAT:

-- A BLANKET COMMITMENT TO WAIVE ALL RIGHTS OF WITHDRAWAL IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

-- THE US IS PREPARED TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS THROUGH A MORE LIMITED COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FOR THE PURPOSES OF DEPLOYING ADVANCED DEFENSES.

-- NEW CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED AND AGREED AS PART OF THE PROPOSED TREATY DESCRIBED IN PARA 4 AND 5 ABOVE. WE WOULD EXPECT SUCH CONDITIONS TO INCLUDE A MATERIAL BREACH OF THAT TREATY OR LINKED AGREEMENTS (E.G., FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS PROVIDED IN AN ASSOCIATED START TREATY).

-- IF THE SOVIETS HAVE OTHER CONCERNS, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM.

7. IF THE SOVIETS QUESTION THE USE OF THE LANGUAGE IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL (I.E. "UNDERTAKES FOR TEN YEARS NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY") THE NEGOTIATOR SHOULD NOTE THAT THE PRESIDENT ANTICIPATED OUR FINDING A SOLUTION WITH RESPECT TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PHRASEOLOGY THAT ACCEPTABLY ACCOMMODATED BOTH US AND SOVIET CONCERNS.

Ronald Reagan

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